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LOST AND FOUNDRY: FORGING A NEW APPROACH TO
PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Lawrence D. Graham
Abstract: The Federal Circuit has been inconsistent in its treatment of patent licensing
agreements held by foundries. Recently, the Federal Circuit held that a foundry contract is a
sale of goods that severs the right of the patentee with respect to the buyer under the patent
exhaustion doctrine. In addition, it held that the applicable license would be construed to
allow foundry rights unless the patentee could prove otherwise. This Note analyzes a string
of Federal Circuit cases involving foundries and patent licenses. It concludes that a foundry
contract should be viewed as a sale of services rather than a sale of goods and that, even if it is
a sale of goods, a foundry transaction should not be a "first sale" under the patent exhaustion
doctrine. In addition, a patent license should be construed with the presumption that foundry
rights were not granted unless the licensee establishes a contrary intent.
Johnny, a small child, is faced with a childhood obstacle: how to get a
cookie without permission. Although his father told him he could take
one if he cleans his room, Johnny decided that price was too high. In
addition Johnny discovers that his brother, Billy, has permission to take
cookies because Billy has already completed his chores. When his father
sees him with a cookie, Johnny explains, "I didn't take a cookie from the
cookie jar-Billy took one for me." Despite the fact that Billy had
permission to take cookies and Johnny was not explicitly prohibited from
using Billy to get a cookie, you can bet that Johnny is in trouble for
circumventing his parent's instructions.
The world of patent law contains analogous issues. Many companies
without permission to use patents held by others are seeking ways around
this obstacle. Rather than gaining "permission" from the patent holder,
they find another company, as Johnny found Billy, to manufacture their
products for them. In this situation, is the manufacturer, or "foundry,"'
truly authorized to make products for the buyer? If so, is the transaction
a sale of manufacturing services or a sale of goods that severs the patent
holder's rights to control those goods?
This Note contends that the Federal Circuit's approach in construing
patent licensing agreements in the foundry context needs clarification.
Initially, it examines basic patent law concepts under the federal patent
statute and common law. It then analyzes the semiconductor industry's
1. A foundry is a place where products are manufactured. Originally, the word applied more
narrowly to places where metal was processed. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 487
(1987) (defining foundry as the act, process or art of casting metals).
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development and use of patent licensing as an example of the use of
foundries. After an examination of illustrative Federal Circuit cases, this
Note argues that a foundry transaction should not be treated as a "first
sale" subject to patent exhaustion. In addition, it contends that foundry
rights are beyond the scope of most patent licensing agreements and
strong policy considerations weigh against a liberal construction that the
license includes foundry rights. Therefore, this Note proposes that courts
approach a patent licensing agreement with the presumption that foundry
rights were excluded.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT PROTECTION
A. The Purposes of Patent Protection
The major purposes of patent protection are to promote invention, to
provide incentives for the development of commercial applications of
those inventions, and to encourage inventors to share their inventions
with the public.2 These goals are so important tat they were given
constitutional protection 3 Congress exercised this constitutional power
by granting inventors a patent monopoly for a limi:ed period of time in
exchange for full disclosure of the invention and the right of the public to
exploit the invention when the patent expires.4
The founders of the United States recognized that invention is a key to
advancement. The innovation that was critical in the formative years of
the United States is no less important today. Now, perhaps more than
ever, the United States must encourage the development and protection
2. F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 440 (2d ed. 1980);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1989) (discussing the promotion of scknce through the potentially
conflicting means of exclusive rights and free access to new discoveries); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813, 1823--25 (1984) (citing costs and
benefits of the patent system); Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and
Innovation, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 867, 906 (1990) (noting that patent law is a compromise
between incentives to invent and monopoly costs); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1059 (1989) (explaining that
intellectual property protection encourages inventive activity which in turn spurs the development of
new products); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
450, 450-51 (1969) (explaining that the patent system is based on the assumptions that society
should have more innovation than it would have without inducement and that a monopoly grant is
the best means of achieving it).
3. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclthsive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries[.]" U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1984).
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of innovation to remain competitive on a global scale.5 To foster this
development, the patent system offers incentives and rewards to the
inventor.6 Ideally, the incentives and rewards built into the patent system
will lead to the maximization of innovation.
B. Basic Patent Concepts
1. Rights Conveyed to Patentee
To achieve the purposes set forth in the Constitution,7 Congress has
promulgated a series of patent laws conveying rights to the patentee.8
Patent laws give the patentee a right to exclude all others from making,
using, or selling the invention in the United States for seventeen years.9
To enforce the patent monopoly, the patentee may seek relief from those
who violate, or "infringe,"'" those rights." The patentee may pursue an
injunction to prevent the violation of rights secured by patent, 2 or may
receive damages in an amount not less than a "reasonable royalty" for the
infringer's use of the invention. 3
2. Patent Exhaustion
The rights of the patent owner are not limitless, however. They do not
attach to the physical object that incorporates or embodies a patented
5. See Nancy Rutter, The Great Patent Plague, Forbes, Mar. 29, 1993, at 59, 65.
6. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977).
A number of metaphors explain the operation of the patent system, according to Professor Kitch. In
this seminal article, he advances that the way the patent system operates is analogous to the
American mineral claim system for public lands. Id. at 271-75. See also supra note 2.
7. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
8. To receive these rights, an inventor must first have the invention approved by the Patent and
Trademark Office. There are three general requirements an invention must satisfy before it will be
approved. The first, called "utility," requires that the invention must be useful. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 1984). The second, known as "novelty," demands, among other things, that the invention
must not have been known or used by others prior to the time of invention by the applicant. 35
U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1984). The third, called "nonobviousness," precludes the granting of a
patent for an invention if the invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the technical field of the invention. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1994).
9. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West Supp. 1994).
10. An "infringer" is defined as anyone who, without authority, makes, uses, or sells any patented
invention within the United States during the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 1984).
11. 35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 1984).
12. 35 U.S.C.A. § 283 (West 1984).
13. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 1984). The court may also award interest, costs, and treble damages.
Id.
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invention once that physical object is sold. When a person purchases the
physical object from either the patentee or one whom the patentee has
authorized to sell the object, the rights of the patentee are said to be
"exhausted." 14  In other words, the rights granted to the patent owner
extend no further than the first sale of the physical embodiment of the
invention. 5 An agreement that attempts to allow the patent owner to
retain a measure of control over the patented article after its initial sale is
viewed as a restraint on trade and is outside the scope of the rights
granted to the patentee.1 6 Thus, one who purchases a patented object
from the patent owner acquires the right to use the cobject or transfer it to
another party without violating the patent holder's rights. 7
3. Licensing
One way a patent holder can exploit its rights while retaining a
measure of control is through licensing. A license is defined as a
promise by the patentee to forbear from suing the licensee for acts which,
but for the license, would be an infringement of the patentee's rights."8
Thus, a license, unlike an assignment, does not constitute an interest in
the patent. 9 Although the patent code contains language that allows
assignment of patent rights," Congress made no express provision for
licensing those rights. The validity of patent liceniing, however, is
supported by an ample body of case law.2' Because patent licensing is
not covered by the patent statute, courts use state contract law for the
14. 3 Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 16-66, 67 (2d ed. 1993).
15. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 453,456 (1873) (setting forth the first sale doctrine).
16. E.g., Cutter Lab., Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 80, 92 (9th Cir. 1949) (holding
that agreements used to effect a restraint of trade or a monopoly violate the law).
17. Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner, 824 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that resale of patented
product is not an infringement if the original purchase was authorized), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042
(1988); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1942). Note, however, that
acquiring the right to use the object does not give the purchaser the right to make and sell additional
objects. 1 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 1-28. Similarly, although a purchaser may repair the object,
he or she may not entirely reconstruct a patented product from parts of used products. Donald S.
Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property LaV § 2E[3] (1992).
18. Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 873 (1930).
19. Id.
20. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
21. E.g., Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.) (holding that patent laws include the
right to license), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (holding patent owner has a common law right to license patents), afl'd,




purposes of interpreting, construing, and ascertaining intent in a patent
license.'
A patent owner has great flexibility through the use of licensing. A
patentee who decides to share patent rights through the use of a license
may choose to share his or her entire bundle of rights. On the other
hand, the patentee may choose to license a much smaller portion of those
rights. In general, a patentee may subdivide and license the rights to
make, sell, and use patented goods.'
The reasons for the disposition of patents through licensing are as
varied as the types of licenses that may be given. For many companies,
the efficient exploitation of the patent requires the use of licensing.24
Alternatively, firms may decide to use licenses to share the risks inherent
in the research and development process.' The result is a development
process that is almost always more efficient than it would have been with
one firm operating by itself.26
Not all patent licensing is the result of two or more companies coming
together to achieve commercial harmony for the sake of market
efficiency. In some cases, products simply cannot be developed and sold
without patent infringement. This is the case when two parties own
patents, each of which is required in the production of particular
22. Baldwin Rubber Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., 107 F.2d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 1939) (holding that
construction of license uses the same rules as for other contracts), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 676 (1940).
23. Extractol Process, Ltd. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 153 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1946) (allowing
patentee to grant one party the right to make and sell the patented article, while granting to another
party the right to use it); Baldwin Rubber Co., 107 F.2d at 353 (allowing patentee to transfer any part
of patent rights by license); De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 20 F.2d 598
(3d Cir. 1927) (defining a license as the right to make, use, or sell articles embodying an invention).
Note, however, that a patent owner does not have unfettered freedom to impose restrictions and
gain advantage through the use of creative licenses. Patent licenses are subject to review for antitrust
violations. See David H. Marks, Patent Licensing and Antitrust in the United States and the
European Economic Community, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 963, 966-69 (1986) (describing some of the
licenses that have been or still are disfavored).
24. Although the firm that owns the patent may be adept at invention and innovation, it is often
less so at manufacturing, marketing, and selling the goods that make use of its inventions. By
licensing other firms to perform these tasks, the patent owner is able to focus its energy where its
talents lie, making the entire operation more efficient. Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms
in PatentLicenses, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1198, 1223 (1983).
25. In these cases, companies may grant licenses to each other to share the results of their
research. This often requires that the licenses be granted before the patent exists. As a result, risk-
averse companies are able to minimize their risk of loss by sharing it with other companies. Id. at
1228.
26. Id. at 1226. See also Lester G. Tesler, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J.L. &
Econ. 271, 272 (1985) (noting that competition may require some cooperation to achieve efficiency).
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products." In this situation, neither party is able to use its own patents
without infringing the patents controlled by the other.28 A common
beneficial arrangement is for each party to agree to license its patents to
the other.29 This arrangement is called "cross-licensing."3
In cross-licensing, firms share their patent portfolios to break the
stalemate that prevents either of them from taking advantage of their
patent rights. 1 In addition, firms normally agree to share related patents
that they acquire in the future, and to plow a certain amount of their
royalties back into research and development to produce those future
32patents. Thus, in addition to breaking the stalemate that existed prior to
the agreement, the use of cross-licensing often leads to more research
and development. Note, however, that firms turn to cross-licensing
agreements when they perceive that they will work: to their advantage.33
As such, most companies avoid cross-licensing agreements with direct
competitors.34 Instead, when direct competitors control patent portfolios
that block each other, they may turn to other techniques to exploit their
patent rights.35 One such technique is to deal with licensed foundries
rather than original patent holders.
II. THE USE OF FOUNDRIES
In the typical foundry arrangement, the buyer approaches the foundry
with a request for manufacturing services. The buyer provides the design
for a product which the foundry is to manufacture.35 Although the buyer
27. 3 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 16-38.
28. E.g., Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. De Forest Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 F. 560 (2d Cir. 1917)
(noting that each party held key patents in telegraph technology).
29. Scherer, supra note 2, at 452.
30. 3 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 16-38.
31. Scherer, supra note 2, at 452.
32. 3 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 16-38.
33. Cf. Note, supra note 24, at 1226-33 (explaining that the raticnal entrepreneur will license
when it is economically efficient).
34. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standard,: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 805, 869-70 (1988) (citing a survey of over 1800 licensing agreements
that revealed that firms were far more likely to license to peripl:eral competitors than direct
competitors because they feared a threat to their competitive position).
35. These may include patent validity disputes, Scherer, supra note 2, at 453, harassment
litigation, id., or other attempts to negotiate, Merges, supra note 34, at 869 n.267 (describing the
possible use of patents as bargaining chips).
36. Richard H. Abramson, When the Chickens Come Home To Roost: The Licensed Foundry
Defense in Patent Cases, The Computer Lawyer, Mar. 1993, at 1, 2.
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provides the design, the buyer does not necessarily hold patent rights in
that design. In fact, the very reason the buyer chooses to use the foundry
is often that the buyer would infringe patent rights held by another if it
made the product itself. Regardless of whether the buyer holds patent
rights in the design, it owns the design; the foundry is expressly not
allowed to sell to others products embodying the design.37 To do so
would violate the intellectual property rights of the buyer. When the
foundry has finished manufacturing the products, they are delivered to
the buyer, who may either sell them "as is" or incorporate them into
another product.
The semiconductor 8 industry presents a good example of the use of
foundries. The use of foundries in this industry, though far from new,
has grown dramatically as a result of the widespread cross-licensing that
occurred in the 1970s.39 Following a period in which many companies
shared their patent portfolios to avoid "patent warfare," new products
were developed at a frenetic pace in this burgeoning industry.40 Over
time, however, the market became saturated with semiconductor
manufacturing capability. Companies began to realize that they could
achieve a financial advantage by using foundries and letting others carry
the heavy burden of manufacturing overhead costs.41 At the same time,
they discovered that many key patent licenses were held by foundries
with excess manufacturing capacity.42 Although these companies could
not manufacture the products themselves without infringing on patent
rights, they calculated that they could market products embodying these
patents if they obtained them from a licensed foundry.43
Thus, in addition to the buyer's inability to manufacture products
without infringing on patent rights, two key factors make foundries
particularly attractive. First, the cost of constructing a fabrication facility
37. Id. See also, e.g., infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
38. A semiconductor is a material whose electrical conductivity is between the high conductivity
of a metal and the low conductivity of an insulator. See Adel S. Sedra & Kenneth C. Smith,
Microelectronic Circuits 140 (1982). Products that are made from semiconducting material, such as
silicon, are also often referred to as semiconductors.
39. See Abramson, supra note 36, at 2.
40. Id.
41. Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Company, Harv. Bus.
Rev., July-Aug. 1991, at 73.
42. Id. at 74.
43. Abramson, supra note 36, at 2-3.
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is insurmountable for many companies.' Without being able to use
foundries to produce their designs, many companies, especially small
start-up firms, might be locked out of the market. Second, many
companies have simply seized an opportunity to make a quick profit.
Noticing that many patentees are able to charge high prices for the
products that use their patents,45 these companies found a way to get a
piece of the pie. By producing a similar or identical46 product and
offering it at a lower price, an upstart can quickly gain a large market
share with a very small investment.47 This tack has been so successful
that it surely will be followed. 8
III. RECENT FOUNDRY CASE LAW
Since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,"9 all patent cases
have been appealed to that circuit. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
rarely grants certiorari to patent cases." Therefore, the direction of
patent law is shaped primarily by the Federal Circuit. Three recent cases
44. At least one estimate has put the cost of building a semiconductor fabrication facility at $1
billion. Rutter, supra note 5, at 65 (quoting F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr., general counsel for Intel Corp.).
45. These high prices are charged by virtue of the monopoly rights received with the patent grant.
This high premium has been referred to as a "knowledge tax." Rappaport & Halevi, supra note 41,
at 75.
46. For an example of the production of a nearly identical product in a foundry, see infra notes
72-73 and accompanying text. In addition to possible patent infringement, a direct copying of a
competitor's product is an infringement under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 905 (West Supp. 1994). If, on the other hand, sufficient time and expense are invested in studying
and improving the product, an affirmative defense of reverse engineerin- is available. 17 U.S.C.A. §
906(a) (West Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, see Richard
H. Stem, Determining Liability for Infringement of Mask Work Rights Under the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 271 (1985).
47. The development costs for a new computer chip can exceed $10) million, while a competing
firm may be able to duplicate the mask (or template) used to manufacture the chips for as little as
$50,000. H.R. Rep. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5750-51. For example, Bob Hwang, creator of ULSI Systems, Inc., saw that Intel was producing
coprocessor chips for about $10 each and selling them for more than $800. By copying the Intel
coprocessor design and using a foundry's fabrication services, ULSI easily was able to cut into the
Intel market for coprocessors with an investment of less than $3 million. Rutter, supra note 5, at
59-60. Hwang faced criminal charges for trade-secret theft related to his design of coprocessors that
are a knockoffofthe Intel coprocessors. Id.
48. This is especially true after the court's approval of foundry arrangements in Intel Corp. v.
ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994)
[hereinafter ULSI]. The ULSI decision signals that the ULSI approach is approved and will likely
encourage others to copy it. Don Clark, Intel Loses in Ruling on Patents, S. F. Chron., June 15,
1993, at Cl.
49. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West 1993).
50. Merges, supra note 34, at 820 n.58.
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establish the contours of the Federal Circuit's treatment of patent licenses
in the foundry context. In the first two cases, the court followed an
approach that presumed foundry rights were excluded from the licensing
agreement. In its latest case, however, the court lost this approach,
holding that foundry rights were included unless the patentee could
prove it intended otherwise.51
A. Lisle Corp. v. Edwards
In Lisle Corp. v. Edwards,52 the Federal Circuit considered whether a
foundry arrangement was within the scope of the patent license. Lisle
contracted for a license to manufacture products embodying a patent
owned by the defendant, Edwards. According to the license, Lisle was
allowed "to make, have made, use and sell" powered windshield track
cutters under a patent held by Edwards.53 Lisle manufactured the tools
described in the license and paid Edwards the required royalty. One of
Lisle's customers was Snap-On, for whom Lisle manufactured tools
bearing the Snap-On trademark. 4 Some of these tools Lisle made for
Snap-On were produced without being marked with the patent notice as
required by Lisle's licensing agreement with Edwards. 55 Thinking that
Snap-On had manufactured tools that violated his patent rights, Edwards
sued Snap-On for infringement. Lisle was joined when Edwards
discovered that Lisle manufactured the tools for Snap-On.
The Federal Circuit held that, contrary to the assertion by Edwards,
Lisle's manufacture of tools with the Snap-On trademark did not
constitute a de facto sublicense by Lisle to Snap-On.56  Finding this
argument to be "without merit and specious," the court held that Lisle's
sales were authorized by the license agreement.57 Thus, when Lisle
manufactured a product using its own design but bearing the name of the
buyer, the court held that the transaction was within the scope of the
patent license agreement.
51. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1570.
52. 777 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 694.
54. Id.
55. Id. Edwards argued that the license could be terminated at his option because of the failure to
mark the tools as required in the license. Id. at 695. The court, however, held that it would be nearly
impossible for Lisle to rectify this error as required by the license, and that Edwards had not




B. Intel Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission
More recently, in Intel Corp. v. United States International Trade
Commission," the Federal Circuit held that a man'afacturer was acting
beyond the scope of the license when it manufactured products designed
by a third party. In this case, Intel Corp. ("Intel") and Sanyo Electric
Co., Ltd. ("Sanyo") entered into a cross-licensing agreement that granted
Sanyo the right to make, use, and sell any "Sanyo products" under Intel's
patents. 9  Intel received similar rights to use Sanyo patents. When
Atmel Corporation sold erasable programmable read-only memories
(EPROMs) manufactured by Sanyo, Intel complained that Atmel
infringed several Intel patents.
The case hinged on the construction of the license agreement. Atmel,
a subsidiary of Sanyo, contended that the EPROMs made by Sanyo were
authorized by the license.' Intel argued in response that when Sanyo
manufactured the EPROMs designed by Atmel, it was manufacturing
Atmel products, rather than Sanyo products.6" Thus, the issue was
whether the license allowed Sanyo to serve as a foundry by
manufacturing products designed by a subsidiary, putting that company's
name on them, and delivering them for sale as products of that
subsidiary.
The court noted that, although it was unclear what the parties meant
by the "Sanyo product" limitation in the cross-licensing agreement, it
was clear that the parties intended to limit the grant in some manner.62
Although the only express limitation withheld the right of Sanyo to
sublicense the rights granted, there was simply no indication that the
parties had intended foundry rights to be included in the agreement.63
58. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Because Atmel was the buyer in this case, the case is generally
referred to as "AtmeL"
59. Id. at 826 n.9. In pertinent part, the license stated:
Intel hereby grants and will grant to Sanyo an [sic] non-exclusive, world-wide royalty-free
license without the right to sublicense except to its Subsidiaries, undEr Intel Patents which read
on any Sanyo Semiconductor Material, Semiconductor Device, Magnetic Bubble Memory
Device, Integrated Circuit and Electronic Circuit products, for the lives of such patents, to make,
use and sell such products.
Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 826.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 827.
63. The court, while trying to satisfy the intent of the parties, employed a default rule that would
not grant foundry rights unless there was evidence to support them. Citing the Administrative Law
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The court found it inequitable that a company, unable to obtain a license
of its own from Intel, could employ Sanyo as a foundry and circumvent
the Intel patents. Because nothing in the agreement indicated that the
parties intended to allow this circumvention, the court held that the
foundry services were beyond the scope of the license.
64
C. Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Technology, Inc.
The facts of Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Technology, Inc.65 are similar
to those of Atmel. In 1983, Intel and the Hewlett-Packard Company
("HP") entered into a cross-licensing agreement.66 The stated purpose of
the agreement, typical of many cross-licensing agreements, was to allow
each company greater freedom to design products without fear of
litigation for infringement of the other's patents.67 The terms of the
licensing agreement were similar to those of the agreement between Intel
and Sanyo,6" with each company having the right to use all patents
controlled by the other. One difference between the two licenses was
that the Intel-HP license omitted the "Sanyo products" type of language
contained in the Intel-Sanyo license.69
In 1988, ULSI entered into an agreement with HP in which HP would
provide foundry services for the manufacture of math coprocessors"
embodying patents licensed from Intel. According to the agreement,
ULSI would supply HP with a proprietary design that HP would use to
produce the coprocessors.7 HP was forbidden to use this design to make
Judge, the court explained that "[WIithout something to explain why the parties would have intended
such a result, the agreement will not be given this strained construction:' Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 828.
65. 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
66. Id. at 1567.
67. Id. See also supra note 36.
68. Specifically, the license agreement granted each party an "irrevocable, retroactive,
nonexclusive, world-wide, royalty-free license under all patents and patent applications owned and
controlled by [the other company) ...." Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp.
1467, 1474 (D. Or. 1991).
69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
70. A microprocessor is an electronic circuit on a small piece of semiconducting material that may
be used as the central processing unit for a computer. A math coprocessor is a particular type of
microprocessor. See generally George Loveday, Microprocessor Sourcebookfor Engineers (1986).
71. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1567.
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products for other companies. After HP manufactured the coprocessors,
they were to be shipped to ULSI for resale as ULSI products.72
Intel, which produced a compatible math coprocessor, subsequently
brought a patent infringement action against ULSI The U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon granted Intel's motion for preliminary
injunction, and ULSI appealed.74 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of preliminary injunction.75 The court held that
the Intel-IP licensing agreement provided ULSI with a defense against
the claim of infringement.76
Two factors cemented the court's decision. First, the court found that
the transfer of products from HP to ULSI was a "first sale" that
exhausted Intel's patent rights with respect to those products. 77 The court
noted that the contract between HP and ULSI was titled "Terms and
Conditions of Sale." Moreover, the agreement contained references to
the "sale" of the semiconductors. 7' Thus, the court concluded, the
agreement "clearly involved the sale of chips, not merely the sale of
fabrication services."79 In addition, the court rejected Intel's argument
that because ULSI owned the intellectual property rights to the math
coprocessors, HP did not sell products to ULSI but merely sold
manufacturing services.8" The court responded that Intel confused the
issue of ownership with the issue of sale. According to the court, as long
as HP sold the chips, it made no difference who owned the intellectual
property rights.8 '
72. Id.
73. Intel became alarmed in 1991 when it learned that ULSI was marketing its product as fully
compatible with a commercially popular Intel math coprocessor. In fact, for some time ULSI even
passed its products off as Intel products. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1567 n.3. ULSI was later permanently
enjoined from misleading consumers as to the origin of its products. Id. at 1567 n.4.
74. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Or. 1991).
75. ULS, 995 F.2d at 1571.
76. Id.
77. Id. For a discussion of the "first sale" doctrine, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying
text.
78. ULS, 995 F.2d at 1569.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. It is the court, however, through its circular response, that seemed to misunderstand the
issue. While Intel conceded that there was no infringement as long as HP's sale of the chips was
consonant with the license granted, Intel argued that the origin and control of the intellectual
property rights are crucial to the issue of whether there was a sale at all. Thus, the court missed the
mark when it stated that origin and control does not matter because there was a sale.
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Second, the court held that the agreement between HP and ULSI was
within the scope of the license Intel granted to HP. Initially, the court
concluded that the HP-ULSI agreement did not constitute a de facto
sublicense prohibited by the Intel-HP agreement.82  Relying on Lisle
Corp. v. Edwards83 and the fact that it had already decided that the
contract was for a sale of goods, the court held that ULSI received only
those rights lawfully incident to the sale of the chips." Furthermore, the
court stated that the Intel-HP agreement contained no language
restricting HP's ability to serve as a foundry. Although each party cited
Atmel, the court distinguished the agreement in Atmel partially on the
basis of the "Sanyo product" language. 5  Because the Intel-HP
agreement did not contain a similar phrase, the court concluded that HP's
right to serve as a foundry was not restricted.86
IV. THE CASE FOR A PRESUMPTION AGAINST FOUNDRY
RIGHTS
The Federal Circuit's approach in ULSI was a retreat from its well-
reasoned conclusions in Lisle and Atmel. Several factors favor a
presumption against foundry rights. First, when the product design is
owned by the buyer, the contract should be considered a sale of services,
rather than a sale of goods. In addition, whether courts interpret the
contract as a sale of goods or services, the foundry arrangement should
not lead to patent exhaustion unless foundry services were authorized in
the licensing agreement. Second, a number of factors indicate that
parties in a typical licensing agreement do not intend the license to be
broad enough to allow foundries. When parties never explicitly
contemplated foundry rights and intent is very difficult to prove, there
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
84. ULS, 995 F.2d at 1570.
85. Although the ULSI court may have distinguished Atmel partially on the basis of the "Sanyo
produce, language not present in the ULSI license, the court was on unstable ground. While the
"Sanyo product" language is important in interpreting the agreement, the reason it is important is
that it provides a clue to the intent of the parties. Even if the "Sanyo product" language is important,
it does not distinguish the two cases. In Atmel, the court presumed that foundry rights were withheld
unless there was evidence that showed they were included. See supra note 63. In ULSI, on the other
hand, the court implicitly presumed that foundry rights were included unless other evidence showed
that they were excluded. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1570.
86. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1570.
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should be a presumption that foundry fights were excluded. Finally,
policy reasons support a presumption on the side of the patent holder.
A. A Foundry Contract Is a Sale of Services, Not Goods
The typical foundry arrangement should not be classified as a sale of
goods, a classification that, if the sale is authorized, invokes the patent
exhaustion doctrine and places the goods beyond the reach of the
patentee. Although at first glance the typical foundry arrangement can
appear to be a contract for the sale of goods, courts should transcend this
first glance. Courts should consider such factors as design ownership,
the substance of the agreement, and the way the courts treat similar
arrangements in other contexts. Even if the foundry contract is construed
as the sale of goods, however, further considerations may mandate a
holding that the transaction is not a "first sale" for the purposes of patent
exhaustion. 8
While courts initially should look to the terms in the written foundry
agreement, use of a phrase similar to "sale of goods" in the foundry
agreement is not especially revealing. It is astonishing that the court in
ULSI would place so much emphasis on this langtage in the contract
between HP and ULSI.8 9 Surely ULSI realized that it could attempt to
use the patent exhaustion defense later in court if it couched the
agreement in terms of a sale of goods rather than services."° Although
87. This default rule would be similar to the rule which holds that, in the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary, a license is not assignable. 3 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 16-13.
88. Courts should be able to consistently construe a foundry agreement as a "transaction involving
goods" for the purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-102, without characterizing
it as a "first sale" for patent exhaustion purposes. Fundamentally, there is no reason that the
definition of a "transaction involving goods" must be the same as that fbr a "first sale." Although
courts have not agreed on the reach of the U.C.C., it is intended to be interpreted broadly, U.C.C. §
1-102, and appears to cover the foundry transaction which "involves" bcth goods and services. See
generally Crystal L. Miller, Note, The Goods/Services Dichotomy and &he U.C.C.: Unweaving the
Tangled Web, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 717 (1984). The patent exhaustion doctrine, on the other
hand, is triggered by a "sale" rather than a "transaction." One way to interpret this difference in
language is that the U.C.C. should cover all transactions unless they clearly do not involve the sale
of goods, while the patent exhaustion doctrine should not apply unless the transaction clearly does
involve the sale of goods. The cases in the middle, like most foundry arrangements, would be
covered by the U.C.C. but not trigger the patent exhaustion doctrine.
89. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
90. Both parties were aware of the possible patent infringement action that might follow. As part
of the agreement, ULSI warranted that it had the proper authority to use the design it provided to HP
and that it would indemnify HP against any liability for patent infringtment. Intel Corp. v. ULSI
Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
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courts certainly must begin their investigation with the written
agreement, they must look past the use of magic words within the four
comers of the document. In construing a licensing agreement, the
objective is to give meaning to the intention of the parties.9 By deciding
that the -P-ULSI agreement was for the sale of goods simply because it
used the word "sale," the court failed to examine the circumstances
surrounding the writing and thereby failed to effectuate the intent of the
parties.
Instead of relying solely on the written contract, courts should
consider other elucidating factors. First, product design ownership
should be used to help determine whether the foundry transaction was a
sale of goods or services. When the buyer owns the product design, the
foundry should be held to be providing a service. When, on the other
hand, the buyer purchases products designed by the maker, the
transaction should be considered a sale of goods.92
In conjunction with looking to design ownership, courts also should
question the substance of the agreement between the foundry and the
buyer. Where the design comes from the buyer who, upon receipt of the
goods, merely packages them and sells them as received from the
foundry,93 the foundry agreement must be deemed a purchase of services.
The court should not hesitate to withhold the patent exhaustion defense
from buyers who seek to circumvent patent rights by copying a
91. See, e.g., Hooker Chemical Corp. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Tenn.
1964) (considering surrounding facts and circumstances to construe license in light of unforeseen
situations); Baldwin Rubber Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., 107 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1939) (noting that
construction of a contract must give effect to the intention of the parties), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 676
(1940). Washington contract law is in accord with this position. Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d
657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990) (holding that, to give effect to the intent of the parties, extrinsic evidence
is always admissible, regardless of whether the meaning of a contract is plain and unambiguous on
its face).
92. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1575 (Plager, J., dissenting). This distinction would be consistent with the
result in Lisle. Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Lisle, see
supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Not all courts, however, would agree with the
importance of design ownership. See Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Tex. 1992)
(holding that product design is not relevant to patent exhaustion doctrine).
93. This was the arrangement between HP and ULSI. ULSI, 995 F.2d at 1567.
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successful product and "laundering '"14 it through a licensed foundry to
usurp the monopoly profits of the patent holder. 5
Finally, classification of the foundry transaction as a sale of goods is
at odds with the treatment of a similar transaction in which the licensee,
rather than serving as a foundry for another company, uses that company
to serve as a foundry for the licensee. In such a situation, the licensee is
said to be exercising "have made" rights.96 Significantly, the transaction
between the licensee who exercises "have made" rights and the foundry
providing the manufacturing services has not been called a sale of goods.
In such cases, the result usually turns on whether the parties intended the
license to grant the licensee the right to have the products made for it by
others.97 If courts viewed this transaction as a sale of goods, they would
never reach the issue of whether the licensee was acting within the scope
of the license; as soon as the licensee purchased the products from the
foundry, the licensee would simply have purchased products from an
infringing manufacturer. Although a subsequent use or sale of the goods
might infringe, the purchase itself would not. Because the courts may
hold the licensee liable for infringement in the making of the goods,
depending upon the scope of the license, thi; type of foundry
arrangement is not viewed as a sale of goods for patent exhaustion
purposes. There is no sound reason for this dichotomy of classification.
If it is not a sale of goods when a licensee exercises "have made" rights,
then it should not be a sale of goods when a licensee provides foundry
services. Courts should be more consistent and treat both foundry
transactions as a sale of manufacturing services.
Even if the foundry arrangement is characterized as a sale of goods
rather than services, it should not be a "first sale" for patent exhaustion
purposes. This transaction is not the ordinary sale in the marketplace
that leads to patent exhaustion.98 On the contrary, the very purpose of
94. Intel has characterized the ULSI activities as a "laundering' operation, whereby ULSI copied
an Intel design that would lead to a patent infringement if they produced it themselves. By finding a
company that held Intel patent licenses, ULSI "laundered" its infringing design to produce what it
hoped would be clean math coprocessors. Robert Ristelhueber, Court Grants Intel Bid to Stay ULSI
Coprocessor Shipments; ULSI Systems Technology, Electronic News, Dec. 23, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arenews File.
95. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
96. Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 459 (D. Del. 1964) (holding that the
right to manufacture a product under a patent license includes the right to have that product made by
another company). These "have made" rights are subject to limitation by the license and the intent
of the parties. Id.
97. Id.
98. Cf. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1938).
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the sale is patent circumvention. Moreover, for the "first sale" doctrine99
to apply, the sale of goods must be either from the patentee or from a
licensee acting within the scope of its license. Because foundry rights
are generally not within the scope of the license, the transfer of goods
from the foundry to the buyer is not a "first sale" even if it is termed a
sale of goods.
B. Foundry Rights are Normally Beyond the Scope of the License
In most cases, foundry rights are never intended to be within the scope
of the license."°  Because courts should construe the contract to
effectuate the parties' intent, they should not rely solely on the written
instrument,' which usually does not mention foundry rights. Instead,
courts should approach the patent license in a foundry situation with the
presumption that such rights are not a part of the agreement unless the
licensee proves otherwise.
Several indicators reveal an intent not to include foundry rights in
licensing agreements. First, the goal of parties in licensing agreements
generally is to allow for mutual development and sale of products
without patent infringement.102  In granting the cross-license, each
company assumes that it is extending its patent rights to only one other
company. Second, these agreements uniformly prohibit sublicensing.0 3
This prohibition is a strong indication that the patent holder does not
want its patent rights to be shared with companies other than the
licensee. Third, patent holders rarely grant licenses to direct
competitors.' This reveals their desire to keep those direct competitors
from gaining access to their valuable patents. If either party
contemplated those competitors might reach their patents through
foundries, they would expressly preclude it. Fourth, the parties simply
99. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
100. See Abramson, supra note 36, at 2 (noting that the general purpose of cross-licenses was to
allow each party to develop products without infringing the patents of the other, the changing
economy in the semiconductor industry presented an unforeseen opportunity for the use of
foundries). See also infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
cert. denied,. 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994); Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,
826 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693, 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
104. See supra note 34.
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do not contemplate foundry rights."°5 While the lack of foresight does
not settle the issue one way or the other, it does force the court to use
extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the license, based on the
probable intent of the parties."° Because the above factors suggest that
parties intend to exclude foundry rights, the courts should presume that
foundry rights are not included unless the licensee proves otherwise.
C. A Presumption Against Foundry Rights Is Better Policy
In addition to the reasons above, there are a. number of policy
considerations that favor a presumption against inclusion of foundry
rights. These include preventing the abuse of the patent license, fairly
compensating the patent holder, fostering innovation and the sharing of
technology, and reducing litigation.
1. Abuse of the License
A company may employ a plethora of innovative techniques to give
an infringing operation the appearance of legitimacy. While only a few
of these have reached the courts, the ULSI decision has opened the door
for further abuse. A default rule against inclusion of foundry rights, on
the other hand, would stem this abuse by reducing the number of ways
that a company can circumvent a patentee's rights. In addition, it would
yield a more equitable result, placing the burden on the circumventing
party to show that its creative use of the patent does not constitute
infringement.
Some methods of circumvention have already been discredited by the
courts. In E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., °7 for
example, Shell Oil Company ("Shell") received a license from E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. ("Du Pont") to manufacture products
embodying Du Pont patents. The license granted "have made" 8 and sell
rights, but restricted the right to sublicense. When Shell reached an
105. See Clark, supra note 48, at C4 (explaining that the parties never thought about the prospect
of foundries); Abramson, supra note 36, at 2.
106. At least one court has held that, where a license agreement is being construed in light of an
unforeseen contingency, the court should read into the agreement, considering the surrounding
circumstances, what the parties would have written had the unforeseen contingency been under
consideration at the time the license was executed. See Hooker Chemical Corp. v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (D. Tenn. 1964).
107. 498 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1985) [hereinafter Du Pont].
108. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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agreement with Union Carbide in which Union Carbide would
manufacture a specified quantity of the products for Shell, and Shell
would sell that same quantity back to Union Carbide, the court found that
the agreement constituted a sublicense.' Although the license contained
no express prohibition of such transactions, the court concluded that the
substance of the transaction was of a type the parties did not intend to
allow.10°
Despite the disapproval of circumventing transactions in Du Pont, the
Federal Circuit's stamp of approval on the ULSI foundry arrangement
will likely lead to other pettifogging efforts. For example, a licensee
may combine its "have made" rights with the foundry rights approved of
in ULSI. In this case, the licensee arranges for a company, "maker," to
manufacture products and sell them to another company, "buyer."
Perhaps to lend an air of legitimacy, the licensee will pass the products
through a warehouse it owns before delivery to "buyer." This
arrangement is clearly beyond the scope of the license, because it is, by
definition, a sublicense for the licensee to allow "maker" to manufacture
and sell products to "buyer."
The Federal Circuit's response to these foreseeable arrangements is
uncertain. Previous decisions separately allowing both "have made"
rights and foundry rights ostensibly would allow an arrangement which
simply has both features at once. Language in the licensing agreement
that prohibits sublicensing, on the other hand, would lead to the opposite
conclusion. Classification of a foundry arrangement as a sale of services,
coupled with a presumption that foundry rights are not included in a
licensing agreement, would compel the holding that the arrangement was
not allowed by the licensing agreement.
Other variations on the licensed foundry theme are limited only by the
imagination of the parties. A licensee might enter into a "joint venture"
in which each company manufactures patented products and shares the
profits. Or perhaps a licensee will "purchase" a third company's
fabrication facilities for nominal consideration and then hire the third
company's employees to manufacture patented products sold by that
third company. Are these arrangements within the scope of the license?
Does the transaction constitute a "first sale" from the licensee to the third
company?
There are simply too many possible variations on the circumvention
theme. Surely the parties to the licensing agreement cannot foresee and
109. Du Pont, 498 A.2d at 1117.
110. Id. at 1113.
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include express restrictions for every possible approach. The proposed
default rule will yield more predictable results.' Courts should presume
foundry rights are prohibited unless evidence reveals a contrary intent by
the parties.
2. Fair Compensation to the Patentee
A rule presuming foundry arrangements are prohibited unless the
licensee proves otherwise would result in fair compensation to the
patentee. When the patentee does not intend to grmat foundry rights, the
compensation it bargains for will be lower than if foundry rights are
included. Although some commentators contend "hat the patentee has
already been adequately compensated,"' that position assumes that the
scope of the license included foundry rights. If foundry rights were not
intended to be included, however, the patentee has not received a royalty
for the use of its patent.
Because companies spend prodigious amounts of money on research
and development,"' the issue of proper compemation is paramount.
Companies will be far less likely to invest that money if the likelihood of
return is uncertain."4  At the same time, the potential reward for the
buyer in a foundry agreement will surely lead many others to follow
ULSI's lead, further cutting into the patentee's royalties." 5 Although
consumers may enjoy the advantage of cheaper products and the
economy will avoid the problem of under-consumption in the short run
as a result of the exploitation of foundries,"'6 such advantages come at
the expense of reduced innovation in the long run.' 
Finally, it is not enough to allow the exploitation of foundries based
upon cross-licensing agreements developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with
the expectation that these companies can draft their agreements more
111. One commentator has argued that foundry arrangements should be allowed as long as they
have "economic substance." Abramson, supra note 36, at 7. It is unclear, however, how a court
might determine whether or not an arrangement had "economic substance." In addition, this
approach overlooks the important question of whether or not the agreement was within the scope of
the license. It certainly seems possible for a manufacturing agreement -,o have "economic substance"
but still be beyond the scope of the license.
112. Abramson, supra note 36, at 6.
113. Rutter, supra note 5, at 64.
114. See generally Kitch, supra note 6.
115. Note, supra note 24, at 1212 n.98. See also Clark, supra note 48.
116. See, e.g., supra note 47.
117. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
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carefully in the future. Many of these agreements contained clauses
granting each party the rights to patents acquired by the other for many
years into the future."' Thus, if the default rule against foundries is not
followed, patentees will continue to lose royalties for a very long time.
3. Encouraging Technology Sharing and Fostering Innovation
The ULSI decision is likely to reduce technology sharing. After ULSI,
many old cross-licenses expose future patents to use by licensed
foundries."9 As a result, companies like Intel may choose to keep their
inventions as trade secrets rather than to patent them. 20 Even if a firm is
not exposed under a long-term licensing agreement, the weakening of its
patent rights by the courts makes it more likely to refrain from disclosing
its inventions by patent.' 2' This response amounts to wasted resources,
and reduces the pace of technological development."2
The proposed rule restricting the approval of foundries, on the other
hand, would encourage technology sharing. The operation of the
marketplace prior to the approval of foundries naturally encouraged
companies to share technology." If firms knew that their old cross-
licensing agreements would not expose their future patents to foundries,
they would not be dissuaded from patenting and sharing their inventions.
In addition to enhancing technology sharing, a rule limiting foundry
rights would cultivate innovation. Companies spend money on research
and development, in part, because they know their efforts will be
protected by patents. 24 Similarly, they know that they can recoup their
investment through the monopoly profits patents bring."2  When the
system is predictable, companies plow their monopoly profits back into
118. For example, the agreement between Intel and HP granted to each party the right to all
patents obtained prior to January 1, 2000. Since patents have a term of 17 years, the license between
Intel and HP will continue through January 1, 2017. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 995
F.2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 923 (1994).
119. Id.
120. Cf. Scherer, supra note 2, at 441.
121. Id.
122. Kitch, supra note 6, at 278-79. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
123. Merges, supra note 34, at 869. See also supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
124. Scherer, supra note 2, at 446. See also Menell, supra note 2, at 1059 (noting that patent
protection induces inventive activity); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1024-26 (explaining that, without
patent protection, many inventions would never come about).
125. See Harry First et al., Revitalizing Antitrust in its Second Century: Essays on Legal,
Economic, and Political Policy 140-41 (1991).
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research. l 6 If those profits are diluted through the unexpected granting
of foundry rights, there will be fewer companie; with the resources
required to innovate. In contrast, the proposed rule would reduce the use
of foundries, and patent holders like Intel would continue to receive the
monopoly profits necessary for innovation.
Transactions like the one between HP and ULSI, on the other hand,
contribute little to the advancement of technology. Intel's policy was to
share its patents with companies that would give something back.'27 In
this case, ULSI simply copied an existing Intel design and marketed it.'
Beyond the short-run advantage for consumers, there is no sound reason
to encourage an arrangement that fails to advance technology.
A more desirable result encourages companies either to obtain their
own licenses directly or to invent around them. Many advancements in
technology have been achieved by companies that focused their energy
on an invention that legitimately avoided patent infringement.'29 The
proposed rule would foster innovation by encouraging companies to
apply their energy to the search for technological advancement rather
than legal loopholes.
Indeed, technology sharing and innovation go hand in hand. In
general, sharing technology through licensing and other agreements
increases efficiency and the pace of innovation. 3 ° In the computer
industry in particular, the joint contributions of many firms has led to a
phenomenal rate of innovation.' This activity should be encouraged by
eliminating the approval of unintended foundries.
126. Id. at 143 (describing Shumpeterian monopoly, with a large share of profits plowed back into
innovation). See also Rutter, supra note 5, at 64. But see Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1040 (arguing
that the Shumpeterian monopoly is an analytical dead end without empirical answers).
127. Rutter, supra note 5, at 65.
128. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
129. Scherer, supra note 2, at 446.
130. See Thomas M. Jorde & Davit J. Teece, Antitrust, Innovaton, and Competitiveness 63
(1992) (firms must cooperate to succeed in innovation); Robert P. Merges & Richard L Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev 839, 895 (1990) (many firms must
contribute for technological advancement); Id. at 896-97 (without cross.licensing, there is nothing to
mitigate the effect of broad patents); Tesler, supra note 26, at 272 (competition may require some
cooperation to achieve efficiency). But cf. Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research
and Development, 17 Rand . Econ. 527 (1986) (while cooperation enhances efficiency, under
certain conditions research and development output sharing may lower the equilibrium level of
effective research and development).
131. Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 894 (cross-licensing with computers is common; as a
result, the pace of innovation has been rapid); Jorde & Teece, sup,'a note 130, at 208 (sharing




4. Reduction of Litigation
A final possible advantage of the adoption of the default rule is a
reduction in patent litigation. A primary reason for cross-licenses was to
avoid the litigation that would have followed without them.132 After
ULS1, parties will still resolve their disputes in court because the court
must construe the meaning of the license. Moreover, the likelihood that
others will copy the ULSI approach may lead to an increased caseload in
the future133
A rule prohibiting foundries in the absence of evidence showing a
contrary intent of the parties will encourage companies to continue using
licensing agreements and patenting their inventions. 34  Without this
proposed rule, a reduction in licensing could lead to the type of litigation
the parties originally sought to avoid, stemming from the situation in
which no company can exploit its own patents without violating patents
held by others.'35 Similarly, a reduction in patents for fear of exposure to
foundries may lead to litigation. Specifically, when parties to a licensing
agreement agree to share patents acquired for many years in the future,'36
it may be bad faith for a company, out of fear of exposure to foundries,
to keep its inventions as trade secrets rather than to file for patent
protection. If one party must share its inventions under the agreement,
but gets nothing in return, litigation is sure to follow.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit should adopt a more restrictive approach to the
use of foundries. First, the court should characterize a foundry
agreement as a contract for services, rather than the sale of goods. Even
if a foundry arrangement is interpreted as a sale of goods, however,
courts should not treat it as a "first sale" under the patent exhaustion
doctrine unless foundry rights are shown to be within the scope of the
license. This characterization would remove the patent exhaustion shield
held by a company circuitously using foundry services. In addition, it
would eliminate the inconsistent characterizations of the transaction in
which the licensee serves as the foundry (characterized as a sale of
132. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., supra note 118.
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goods) an the nearly identical transaction in which the licensee uses
another firm as a foundry (characterized as a sale of services).
Second, the court should reconsider its approach tD the construction of
patent licensing agreements. Because several factors reveal that parties
do not intend to grant foundry rights in the typical patent cross-licensing
agreement, licensing agreements should be construed to exclude foundry
rights unless evidence is produced to show a contrary intent. Although
parties may sometimes intend the scope of cross-licensing agreements to
include foundry rights, policy considerations encourage a more
restrictive reading of ambiguous agreements.
